Approved For Release 2008/07/02 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001403580009-7

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I asked Es to have NFAC hold its represe to midude feed back from this breakfost.

D.

DIA review completed.

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## **EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

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| 12  | DDCI     |        | Х    |      |          |
| 3   | D/DCI/RM |        |      |      |          |
| 4   | DD/NFA   | X      |      |      |          |
| 5   | D/DCI/CT |        |      |      |          |
| 6   | DD/A     |        |      |      |          |
| 7   | DD/O     |        |      |      | <u> </u> |
| 8   | DD/S&T   |        |      |      |          |
| 9   | GC       |        |      |      |          |
| 10  | LC       |        |      |      | ····     |
| 11  | IG       |        |      |      |          |
| 12  | Compt    |        |      |      |          |
| 13  | D/PA     |        |      |      |          |
| 14  | D/EE0    |        |      |      |          |
| 15  | D/PPPM   |        |      |      |          |
| 16  | AO/DCI   |        |      |      |          |
| 17  | PB/NSC   |        |      |      |          |
| 18  | NIO/SP   |        | Х    |      |          |
| 19  | /ICS     |        | Х    |      |          |
| 20  |          |        |      |      |          |
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Recommendation together with a reply for DCI's signature, please.

DIA review completed.

Executive Secretary
4 June 81

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## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



81-1384

1 JUN 1981

C-0195/DIO

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: "Red-blue" Force Comparisons in Estimative Products (U)

- 1. (C) Your predecessor placed considerable emphasis on incorporating "red-blue" force comparisons in estimative products. NIE 11-3/8-80, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Conflict through 1990," contains such comparisons and the terms of reference for NIE 11-3/8-81 and NIE 11-14-81, "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," provide for similar treatment.
- 2. (U) The inclusion of net assessments in National Intelligence Estimates has been the subject of controversy as to legality within the framework of the statutory responsibilities of the various government agencies, competence of the intelligence community to produce such assessments, dangers of consolidating defense procurement judgments in the Department of Defense or Central Intelligence Agency (depending on where one sits), the potential for damage to the integrity of both the intelligence process and its personnel by direct association with defense procurement decisions, the lack of clear definition of the "net assessment" method and consequent concern as to its manipulability to reach preconceived conclusions, and other serious grounds. A central issue for the past few years has been whether the DCI and Central Intelligence Agency, through direct and daily control of the net assessment production, should assume the role of both advocate for particular systems or decisions and judge of the utility of various potential weapons systems.
- 3. (U) In my view, the use of the "net assessment" approach during the last years has produced a distinct loss of chastity in an NIE process which should remain as pure as Caesar's wife. Further, I have sensed a strong element of advocacy where nothing short of clinical detachment should exist. I do support the use of "comparative analysis" which I believe to be a more useful descriptor for forces where the U.S. role can be set aside, and DIA has performed such analyses for the Arab-Israeli, North Korea South Korea, Taiwan Straits, Sino Soviet border, Sino-Vietnam border, and other situations. I believe such comparisons are legitimate intelligence functions. Where U.S. forces are involved, however, the intelligence community ventures into ground claimed by others and raises threats to its own objectivity and to its relations with other departments and agencies.

Classified by DIA -DIO
Declassify on 14 May 1987

CONFIDENCIAL

## CONTINUENTAL

4. (U) An early resolution of this matter would, I believe, enable the community to eliminate much wasted motion and emotion over the coming years, and perhaps avoid the needless intrusion of extraneous factors into NIE judgments. Accordingly, I believe it would be appropriate to place this topic on the NFIB or NFIC agenda for early consideration. I strongly recommend that measure as a step toward resolution of this important issue.

EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR. Lieutenant General, USAF Director

DOMESTIC STREET